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Draft of “Reforming the NAFTA Investment Regime” in The Future of North American 
Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Pardee Center Task Force Report (November 
2009). Includes previously unpublished appendix. 
REFORMING THE NAFTA INVESTMENT REGIME 
Gus Van Harten1 
NAFTA’s investment regime should be reformed. This paper elaborates a tiered set 
of reforms that are designed to (1) encourage foreign investment, while (2) affording 
appropriate policy space for governments to develop and regulate their economies in 
a sustainable manner and (3) ensuring equitable governance of investment disputes 
such that foreign investors are not privileged, procedurally or substantively, over 
domestic investors and citizens. 
The proposals have been tiered according to their feasibility, based especially on 
whether they would require an amendment of NAFTA. An appendix outlines the 
reforms in more detail and indicates the extent to which each has been adopted in 
trade or investment agreements concluded since NAFTA. 
The need for reform 
Investment protection and regulation for sustainable development 
An important aim of NAFTA is to encourage and protect foreign investment in 
order to create jobs, develop the economy, and support the shift to a green economy. 
Toward this end, foreign investors are given robust protections, especially by the 
provision in NAFTA Chapter 11 for compulsory international arbitration to decide 
investor claims against governments. In various respects, however, NAFTA goes too 
far in favoring investors over other interests. 
Foreign investors are protected under NAFTA by broad standards on expropriation, 
non-discrimination, fair and equitable treatment, and other topics. However, the past 
decisions of some NAFTA tribunals have interpreted these standards in an overly 
expansive, pro-investor direction. This calls for clarification that the treaty does not 
require payment of public compensation to investors where they are affected 
negatively by laws or regulations passed in good faith for a public purpose (Peterson 
2004, 28-32; Lawrence 2006, 294-5). 
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It is likely that governments in each NAFTA state have been influenced in their 
regulatory decisions by the risk of a NAFTA claim. Foreign investors have shown 
clearly that they will challenge virtually any government measure. For example, 
NAFTA Chapter 11 has to date been used to challenge: measures to control gasoline 
content and protect groundwater resources, a legislative ban on the export of 
hazardous wastes, a phase-out of the agricultural chemical lindane, a court decision 
leading to a large punitive damages award, the creation of an ecological park, the 
environmental assessment of a quarry project, the regulation of open-pit mining near 
Native American sacred sites, and, most recently, the implementation of safety 
standards for foreign trucks. 
Various post-NAFTA reforms appear to accept that arbitration tribunals have used 
their discretion to take investment treaties too far in favor of investors (see Appendix 
A; Thomas 2002; Gaillard 2002, 249; McLachlan 2002, 340; Tollefson 2002, 207-13 
and 224-5; Munro 2005; Salgado 2006). Likewise, in its review of the Metalclad award 
against Mexico, the British Columbia Supreme Court observed with respect to the 
tribunal’s definition of ‘indirect expropriation’ (United Mexican States 2001, para. 99): 
The Tribunal gave an extremely broad definition of expropriation for the 
purposes of Article 1110. In addition to the more conventional notion of 
expropriation involving a taking of property, the Tribunal held that 
expropriation under the NAFTA includes covert or incidental interference 
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole 
or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic 
benefit of property. This definition is sufficiently broad to include a legitimate 
rezoning of property by a municipality or other zoning authority. 
Despite this, the court was unable – under the existing rules of the NAFTA regime – 
to correct this aspect of the Metalclad award. 
Concerns about regulatory chill 
Pro-investor interpretations of indirect expropriation and other standards are 
troubling because they raise the risk of ‘regulatory chill’. They enable foreign 
investors to entangle governments in international litigation and expose them to 
costly awards, even where the government has acted in good faith in pursuit of a 
worthy objective. In the words of one lawyer, the ability to sue under an investment 
treaty is: 
an open invitation to unhappy investors, tempted to complain that a financial 
or business failure was due to improper regulation, misguided macroeconomic 
policy, or discriminatory treatment by the host government and delighted by 
the opportunity to threaten the national government with a tedious expensive 
arbitration (Rogers 2000). 
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Various studies have raised this concern. They have highlighted the danger that 
NAFTA (and other investment treaties) frustrate government efforts to protect 
health and the environment, preserve natural resources (such as fresh water), 
counteract climate change, promote economic development, regulate utilities and 
deliver government services, make zoning decisions, reform health care, or regulate 
the financial sector (Werksman et al. 2001; Shrybman 2001; Flood and Epps 2002; 
Been and Beauvais 2003; Porterfield 2004; Lawrence 2006; Jenkins 2007; Cumming 
and Froehlich 2007; Gerbasi and Warner 2007; Shrybman 2008; Mann 2008). 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to establish definitively that any particular measure 
was abandoned as a result of a NAFTA claim. But it appears that various government 
measures have been withdrawn in the face of threatened claims. Documented cases 
include, for example, withdrawn proposals in Canada to require plain packaging of 
cigarettes, to establish public auto insurance, and to privatize a water filtration plant 
(Schneiderman 2008, ch 3-4; Carrigg 2001). 
The Ethyl case 
Perhaps the clearest case of regulatory chill is the Ethyl arbitration. Faced with 
a NAFTA claim, the Canadian government withdrew its restrictions on a 
gasoline additive called MMT – restrictions that had been justified on the 
precautionary basis that burning MMT posed an unacceptable risk of nerve 
and brain damage in humans and especially in children – after a NAFTA 
tribunal allowed the manufacturer of MMT to bring its claim under Chapter 
11 (Ethyl 1998). Besides withdrawing its regulation, the Canadian government 
also agreed to (1) issue a statement that MMT did not pose a health threat and 
(2) pay (U.S.)$13 million in compensation to the manufacturer, an amount that 
exceeded Environment Canada’s annual budget for enforcement and 
compliance (Traynor 1998; Schettler 1999; Fletcher 2002). The case indicates 
how NAFTA can be used by foreign investors to pressure a government to 
‘purchase its environmental sovereignty by settling its way out of Chapter XI 
claims’ (Cumming and Froehlich 2007, 132). 
Not all NAFTA claims have been successful (many are still pending). But the fact 
that they can be brought with such ease enables foreign investors to pressure or 
harass governments and to frustrate important initiatives (Cumming and Froehlich 
2007, 124). An ongoing claim by Dow AgroSciences against Canada, for example – in 
response to Quebec’s restrictions on cosmetic use of the chemical pesticide 2,4-D – 
appears aimed as much at deterring other governments from taking similar steps to 
reduce pesticide use for health and environmental reasons, as much as it is meant to 
win compensation of $2 million, as claimed, for the incidental impact on Dow’s sales 
in Quebec. 
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The threat to financial, economic, and environmental reform 
 
Beyond NAFTA Chapter 11, foreign investors have used investment treaties to bring 
more than 250 investor-state claims against countries, usually in the developing 
world, over the last 15 years. They have challenged a wide range of policies and 
decisions. Perhaps most ominous are the 46 claims brought against Argentina for its 
reforms in the face of the country’s financial and economic crisis in 2001. These 
claims have led to hundreds of millions of dollars in awards against Argentina and 
will likely generate billions more. Moreover, some tribunals have relied on dubious 
pro-investor readings of the treaties to support awards (CMS 2005). In response, 
Argentina has declined to pay awards, thus calling into question the utility of the 
system even for investors (Peterson 2009). 
 
So long as the U.S., Canada, and Mexico do not take steps to limit their exposure to 
claims, they continue to put their public treasuries and regulatory processes at risk 
(Cumming and Froehlich 2007, 135). Law firms specializing in investment arbitration 
are currently drumming up business by advising investors on how to bring investor-
state claims for losses caused by government reforms in response to the present 
financial crisis. For example, according to a client pamphlet issued recently by one 
London-based firm (Cameron May 2009): 
 
States are coming under increasing pressure to take measures to bolster their 
national economies in response to the global economic downturn. Whist it 
may be appropriate for States to take measures to address the financial crisis, 
foreign investors could be entitled to compensation if such measures are taken 
in breach of the terms of investment treaties…. Since the Argentinean crisis 
has similarities with the financial difficulties now being encountered around 
the world, it is instructive to see how claims arising from huge losses suffered 
at the time are now being resolved…. 
 
Useful development measures that are specifically prohibited 
 
Capital controls and performance requirements are prohibited under NAFTA even 
though they can play an important role in avoiding financial crises or boosting 
productivity and employment. Tailored use of such measures should be facilitated 
based on evidence of their utility to prevent capital flows from undermining financial 
systems or to ensure that foreign investment contributes to economic development. 
For policy coherence, the use of these measures could be subject to supervision by a 
regional commission, rather than by investor-state arbitration. 
 
Equitable governance of investment disputes 
 
Investment disputes should be resolved fairly, via an independent adjudicative 
process that is accountable to public decision-makers. Investors may have good cause 
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to seek protection through judicial review, even for apparently legitimate government 
action. But the investor-state model under NAFTA is overly dependent on a small 
group of arbitrators in its resolution of high matters of public policy. 
 
For all investors, foreign or domestic, protection should be (and usually is) provided 
by domestic courts. Exceptionally, back-up protection may be required at the 
international level. But international adjudication should be an exceptional remedy, 
not a first resort. Foreign investors should not be able to circumvent domestic courts 
that offer a forum for justice that is at least as fair and independent as investor-state 
arbitration. In this and other respects, foreign investors should not be privileged over 
domestic investors and citizens, who are also profoundly affected by government 
decisions, and should be entitled to participate in arbitration alongside investor 
interests. 
 
The privileging of foreign investors over citizens 
 
Investor-state arbitration in its current form gives foreign investors the tremendous 
power to force states to submit the decisions of their legislatures, courts, and 
administrations to intensive review and discipline by arbitrators, outside of any court 
process (Gerbasi and Warner 2007, 130). Many disputes that can and should be 
resolved at the domestic level are thus brought before international tribunals. The 
system is particularly lopsided in that, while investors can claim tax-funded 
compensation, they are not themselves subject to regulation through the adjudicative 
process (Yu and Marshall 2008). 
 
The lack of independence of investor-state arbitrators 
 
The use of arbitration to make final decisions in public law – especially where it 
involves legislative choices or public budgets – undermines judicial independence. 
Arbitrators are reasonably seen to have an interest to interpret the law in favor of 
investors so as to encourage future claims and grow the arbitration industry. This 
apparent bias offers a credible explanation for the surprisingly pro-investor 
approaches of numerous tribunals (e.g. Metalclad 2000; Pope & Talbot 2001; Tecnicas 
2003; Santa Elena 2000; Maffezini 2000; CME 2001; Siemens 2004; Tokios 2004; 
Occidental 2004; CMS 2005). These tribunals have required payment of public 
compensation for a range of non-discriminatory measures where foreign investors 
have sustained incidental loss as a result of government action. Moreover, tribunals 
are insulated from review by independent judges, whether domestic or international 
(Sornarajah 2002; Atik 2004, 221-224; Van Harten 2007, ch 7). 
 
These are fundamental concerns, especially because NAFTA allows for such broad 
review of legislative and general policy decisions. Arbitrators are given authority that 
goes well beyond that of courts and tribunals under other treaties (other than other 
trade and investment agreements). 
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Overarching principles and goals for reform 
 
The principle of sustainable development 
 
Investment treaties should allow appropriate policy space for governments to take 
action, free of the risk of a ruinous damages award, to enact laws and regulations on 
pressing issues, so long as the measure in question does not target foreign investors in 
a specific way for abuse or discrimination. This policy space should be widest for 
legislatures and courts, and for general policy decisions of the executive. Reforms 
should aim to establish a regime in which states have appropriate options to regulate 
in good faith without risk of international claims. 
 
The principle of equitable governance 
 
To ensure equitable governance, NAFTA adjudication must be insulated from 
inappropriate influence by investors and other private actors. The process should 
defer to the democratic legitimacy of legislatures, the independence of domestic 
courts, and the expertise of executive agencies (Weiler 2000, 207-210; Brown 2002, 
40-41). Foreign investors should not be allowed to circumvent domestic courts where 
the courts offer justice. NAFTA arbitration itself should offer an independent and 
fair process, both for the investor and the state, consistent with principles of judging 
in the constitutional traditions of the NAFTA states and in international law (UN 
Basic Principles 1985; Mackenzie and Sands 2003; Meron 2005; Van Harten 2008). 
 
Recommended instruments, policies and provisions 
 
Recommended reforms to NAFTA, and their key components, are summarized 
below. Appendix A elaborates on these proposals in detail, including by identifying 
post-NAFTA agreements that already incorporate or contemplate many of the 
proposed reforms. 
 
Notably, many of the revisions adopted in post-NAFTA treaties are based on the 
‘May 10 Agreement’ in the U.S. Congress and Administration. This post-NAFTA 
position is an important starting point for NAFTA reform. For reasons discussed 
above, though, it falls short, especially because it does not address (1) the danger that 
arbitrators will continue to interpret the treaty – however carefully it is re-worded – in 
an unduly pro-investor way or (2) the procedural privileges that investor-state 




The recommended reforms are summarized as follows. 
 
Reform the dispute settlement regime: 
• consider the option of removing the investor-state regime outright from NAFTA 
(requires amendment); 
• provide for standing in the process for persons or entities whose interests are 
directly affected by an investor-state dispute, and allow states to bring counter-
claims against foreign investors for breaches of their own duties or obligations 
(requires amendment); 
• establish a regional adjudicative body to replace or supplement the role of private 
arbitration, and to ensure independence and enhance coherence in the decision-
making process (requires amendment); 
• provide for the members of the regional adjudicative body to develop rules to 
govern the resolution of investor-state disputes (requires amendment); 
• as a temporary measure to ensure independence, and as provided for in NAFTA 
Article 1124(4) itself, designate a roster of experts – preferably sitting judges – 
from which presiding arbitrators must be chosen (does not require amendment of 
the NAFTA text); 
 
Ensure that investor-state arbitration is an exceptional remedy: 
• take steps to limit forum-shopping and ‘claims of convenience’ by non-NAFTA 
investors (may not require amendment); 
• preclude foreign investors from circumventing domestic courts where the courts 
offer justice (may not require amendment); 
• expand NAFTA’s screening mechanism to ensure flexibility and predictability in 
key fields of regulation, such as financial regulation and health/ environmental 
protection (requires amendment); 
 
Clarify broadly-framed substantive standards: 
• limit the concepts of indirect expropriation and ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to 
preclude their application to non-discriminatory measures that are adopted in 
good faith for a public purpose, based for example on the awards in Methanex 
(2005) and Glamis Gold (2009) (does not require amendment); 
• clarify that national treatment requires evidence of either (1) intentional 
discrimination or (2) de facto discrimination against foreign investors as a group, 
based for example on the ADF award (2003) (does not require amendment); 
• clarify that most-favored-nation treatment does not defeat exceptions in NAFTA 
or extend to dispute settlement provisions of other treaties, based for example on 




Check the discretion of investor-state tribunals: 
• direct tribunals to defer to legislative and judicial decisions, and to policy 
decisions of the executive, where the decision does not target foreign investors 
for abusive or discriminatory treatment (does not require amendment); 
• clarify that tribunals should defer to the shared views of the NAFTA 
governments participating in an investor-state arbitration regarding the proper 
interpretation of NAFTA (does not require amendment); 
• clarify that tribunals may award partial damages, or simply a costs award or 
declaratory award, as adequate satisfaction for a foreign investor, and that any 
damages award should account for the degree of blameworthiness of the 
respondent state (does not require amendment); 
 
Provide exceptions to protect legitimate regulation: 
• incorporate exceptions from post-NAFTA treaties that aim to safeguard the 
financial system (may not require amendment); 
• allow for tailored use of capital controls and performance requirements where 
justified to maintain financial stability or boost productivity and employment 
(requires amendment); 
• extend NAFTA’s general exceptions to its investment chapter (requires 
amendment); 
 
Revise the treaty’s statement of objectives: 
• revise the statement of objectives of both NAFTA and its investor-state regime 
by referring, among other things, to the equitable governance of investment 
disputes based on judicial openness, independence, and accountability (requires 
amendment). 
 
Not all of these reforms require amendment of NAFTA. NAFTA authorizes the Free 
Trade Commission – made up of Cabinet-level representatives of each NAFTA state 
– to make interpretations of the treaty that are binding on tribunals. This is an 
important tool to clarify the treaty. That said, other reforms that require amendment 
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APPENDIX A 
NAFTA’S INVESTMENT REGIME – PROPOSED REFORMS  
 
Proposed reform Relevant 
principle(s) 
Comment/ rationale Requires 
amendment? 
References 
REFORM THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REGIME 
Consider removing the investor-
state mechanism from NAFTA 
and replacing it with an inter-
governmental or inter-state 






Ensure like treatment of 
investors and non-investors. 
Many trade agreements do not 
provide for investor-state 
arbitration, indicating that other 
methods of dispute resolution 
would satisfy U.S. (and likely 
other NAFTA states’) 
negotiating objectives. 
Yes e.g. U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement; U.S.-Israel Free Trade 
Agreement. 
Provide for sub-national 
government or private parties to 
be given standing in investor-state 
adjudication where their interests 






Limits the one-sidedness of the 
process by ensuring a wider 
range of direct interests have full 
access to the decision-making 
process. 
Yes CAFTA, Article 10.20(3); U.S.-Chile 
FTA, Article 10.19(3); U.S.-Rwanda 
BIT, Article 28(3); Canada Model BIT, 
Article 39 (each providing for amicus 
curiae representation, but not direct 
standing, for non-investors). 
Establish a regional adjudicative 
body to decide NAFTA Chapter 
11 disputes, consisting of 
adjudicators who enjoy objective 











The body could either replace 
the existing arbitration process 
or provide for an appellate 
process. The former is preferred 
to avoid duplication and ensure 
independence by removing the 
role of the arbitration industry. 
 
The body should be designed to 
allow it to be extended to other 
trade or investment agreements, 
with the consent of the relevant 
states. 
Yes CAFTA, Article 10.20(10); U.S.-Chile 
FTA, Article 10.19(10); U.S.-Colombia 
FTA, Article 10.20(10); U.S.-Peru FTA, 
Article 10.20(10); U.S. Model BIT, 
Article 28(10) (each referring to the 
prospect of an appellate body). 
 
IISD Model International Investment 
Agreement (2005), Article 40. 
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Provide for members of a regional 
adjudicative body to develop rules 
to govern investor-state disputes 
according to principles of judicial 
openness, independence, and 
accountability. 
 
Alternatively, provide for the Free 





fairness of the 
decision-making 
process 
The rules of arbitration used 
under NAFTA are based on the 
model of commercial arbitration 
and are not suited to resolution 
of high public policy.  
 
 
The rules of international courts 
and tribunals typically reflect the 
principles of judicial openness, 
independence, and accountability 
to a greater degree than rules 
used in investor-state arbitration, 
including the ICSID Rules, 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, 
UNCITRAL Rules, ICC Rules, 
LCIA Rules, and SCC Rules. 
 
 
Yes CAFTA, Article 10.21; U.S. Chile FTA, 
Article 10.20; U.S.-Colombia FTA, 
Article 10.21; U.S.-Peru FTA, Article 
10.21; U.S.-Uruguay BIT, Article 20; 
U.S.-Rwanda BIT, Article 29; U.S. 
Model BIT, Article 29; Canada-Peru 
FTA, Article 835; Canada-Colombia 
FTA, Article 830; Canada Model BIT, 
Article 38; Norway draft Model BIT, 
Article 19 (each providing a firmer 
commitment to openness than does the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission’s 
interpretive note of 31 July 2001). 
 
Canada Model BIT, Article 27(2) 
(allowing a commission equivalent to 
the NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
to make arbitration rules that bind 
tribunals under the treaty). 
As a temporary measure pending 
further reform, and as already 
provided for in NAFTA, establish 
a roster of arbitrators from which 







Implementing this NAFTA 
commitment would assist to 
enhance confidence in Chapter 
11 arbitration, especially in the 
appointment of presiding 
arbitrators. 
 
Presiding arbitrators should be 
appointed on a rotating (or 
otherwise objective) basis, and 
the number on the roster would 
ideally be less than the 45 called 
for in NAFTA Article 1124. To 
ensure independence, members 
of the roster could be sitting 
No NAFTA Article 1124(3) and (4) and 
Article 1126(5). 
 
IISD Model International Investment 
Agreement (2005), Article 40(E). 
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judges with experience in 
international law, reflecting 
domestic courts’ objective 
guarantees of independence. 
Direct that the disputing parties, 
and the appointing authority, must 
ensure that any arbitrators they 
appoint have expertise in the 
relevant field of regulation, as 





Ensures that arbitrators have 
expertise in the relevant field of 
government regulation rather 
than simply international law or 
investment.  
Yes U.S. Model BIT, Article 20(2)(c)(i) and 
(5) (providing for such expertise where 
the claim relates to financial services).  
 
NAFTA Article 1124(4). 
Develop a code of conduct for 
investor-state adjudicators that 
accounts for the uniquely public 







Ameliorates, to an extent, 
concerns about the lack of 
independence and impartiality in 
investor-state arbitration. 
No Canada-Peru FTA, Article 826(2)(c). 




Proposed reform Relevant 
principle(s) 
Comment/ rationale Requires 
amendment? 
References 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION AS AN EXCEPTIONAL REMEDY 
Provide expressly that a NAFTA 
Party may deny the benefit of the 
investment chapter to a foreign 
company that has no substantial 
business activities (or, as a more 
stringent control, its corporate 











Allows a respondent state to 
prevent forum-shopping and 
‘claims of convenience’ by 
foreign investors from outside 
the NAFTA region, consistent 
with post-NAFTA treaties. 
Yes U.S.-Colombia FTA, Article 10.12(2); 
U.S.-Rwanda BIT, Article 17(2). 
U.S. Model BIT, Article 17(2). 
 
Canada-Colombia FTA, Article 814(2). 
 
Norway draft Model BIT, Article 
2(1)(ii). 
Expand NAFTA’s screening 
mechanisms to include other 








Permits the affected NAFTA 
states to pre-empt frivolous or 
unduly expansionist claims by 
foreign investors in sensitive 
fields, such as financial 
regulation and health/ 
environmental protection. 
 
Allow agencies of the 
respondent state and the 
investor’s home state, or the 
Free Trade Commission, an 
opportunity to re-affirm their 
right to regulate by agreeing that 
a challenged measure does not 
violate NAFTA and disposing of 
the claim. 
Yes Screening mechanisms under NAFTA 
currently apply only to expropriation 
claims involving taxation (Article 
2103(6)), measures subject to the 
financial services exception (Article 
1410), and the interpretation of 
annexes (Article 1132). 
 
Canada Model BIT, Article 17. 
 
Re-institute the duty of foreign 
investors to exhaust domestic 
remedies that are reasonably 
available to them. Alternatively, 





Ensures that investor-state 
arbitration is a remedy of last 
resort relative to domestic courts 
that offer justice. 
Yes Norway draft Model BIT, Article 15(3). 
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against a claim by showing that 
domestic remedies are reasonably 
available. 
Clarify that a foreign investor, to 
establish a breach of a NAFTA 
standard, must first challenge the 
measure in a reasonably-available 
domestic forum. Alternatively, 
clarify that failure by a foreign 
investor to exhaust domestic 
remedies supports an interpretive 
presumption by the tribunal for 
issues on which the investor had 
reasonable opportunity to obtain 





Ensures that the challenged 
decision is in fact a final decision 
of the respondent state’s 
decision-makers.  
No This approach is consistent with the 
reasoning of the Loewen award, which 
was interpreting NAFTA Article 1105 
in relation to a domestic court decision 
(Loewen 2003, para. 143 and 156). 
Clarify that foreign investors who 
are only minority shareholders in a 
domestic company in the 
respondent state may bring a 
NAFTA claim with respect to 
their shareholder interest, but not 
with respect to the interests of the 










Ensures that foreign investors 
cannot manipulate investor-state 
arbitration so as to duplicate or 
circumvent domestic courts. 
 
In the GAMI case, both Mexico 
(as the respondent state) and the 
U.S. (the investor’s home state) 
called for the tribunal to adopt 
this interpretation of NAFTA. 
However, the tribunal rejected 
their submissions in favor of an 
expansive reading that apparently 
allows minority shareholders to 
advance claims beyond their 
shareholder interest (GAMI 
2004, para. 29-33). 
No U.S.-Chile FTA, Annex 10-C(1)(b). 
Clarify that a domestic company 
that lacks the characteristics of an 
Equitable 
governance – 
May limit unduly expansive 
interpretations by tribunals, by 
No U.S.-Rwanda BIT, Article 1, note 1. 
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investment is not an investment. privileging of 
foreign investors. 
ensuring that genuine ‘foreign 
investors’ only may bring 
investor-state claims. 
Norway draft Model BIT, Article 2(2). 
Limit access to investor-state 




stability of the 
financial system 
Allows for an orderly process of 
negotiation and restructuring by 
creditors as a group, from of 
investor claims. 
Yes U.S.-Colombia FTA, Annex 10-F. 
U.S.-Peru FTA, Annex 10-F. 
U.S.-Uruguay BIT, Annex G. 
Exclude portfolio investment 
from the definition of investment 
or limit access to investor-state 
arbitration where the claim arises 
from portfolio investment. 
Sustainable 
development – 
stability of the 
financial system 
Preserves regulatory flexibility 
over short-term capital flows 
that may undermine financial 
stability. 
Yes IISD Model International Investment 




Proposed reform Relevant 
principle(s) 
Comment/ rationale Requires 
amendment? 
References 
CLARIFY THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS 






Responds to past tribunals’ 
unduly expansive, pro-investor 
interpretations of indirect 
expropriation, consistent with 
post-NAFTA treaties. 
No CAFTA Annex 10-C. 
U.S.-Chile FTA, Annex 10-D. 
U.S.-Colombia FTA, Annex 10-B. 
U.S.-Peru FTA, Annex 10-B. 
U.S.-Uruguay BIT, Annex B and 
Protocol (section 3). 
U.S.-Rwanda BIT, Annex B. 
U.S. Model BIT, Annex B. 
 
Canada-Peru FTA, Annex 812.1. 
Canada-Colombia FTA, Annex 811. 
Canada Model BIT, Annex B.13(1). 
 
Norway draft Model BIT, Article 6(2). 
 
IISD Model International Investment 
Agreement (2005), Article 8(I). 
 
See especially the Methanex 
interpretation of Article 1110, where 
the tribunal concluded that non-
discriminatory measures adopted for a 
public purpose, in the absence of any 
breach of a specific commitment to the 
investor, are not deemed expropriatory 
(Methanex 2005, Part IV – Chapter D – 
para. 7). 
Clarify (and limit) the terms of 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ and 
‘full protection and security’ as 





Supplements the existing 
interpretive note on NAFTA 
Article 1105, consistent with 
post-NAFTA treaties that were 
No CAFTA, Article 10.5(2) and (3). 
U.S.-Chile FTA, Article 10.4(2) and (3). 
U.S.-Colombia FTA, Article 10.5(2) 
and (3). 
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standard in customary 
international law.  
themselves revised to address 
pro-investor interpretations by 
NAFTA and other tribunals. 
 
‘Fair and equitable treatment’ has 
been invoked most frequently by 
tribunals to find violations of 
investment treaties and to issue 
awards against states, including 
via expansive readings of this 
term (e.g. CMS 2005). Indeed, a 
NAFTA arbitrator in one case 
expressed his preference to find 
a violation of fair and equitable 
treatment in order to displace 
public concerns about the 
expropriation standards (SD 
Myers, separate opinion of B. 
Schwartz, para. 222). 
U.S.-Peru FTA, Article 10.5(2) and (3). 
U.S.-Uruguay BIT, Article 5(2) and (3). 
U.S.-Rwanda BIT, Article 5(2) and (3). 
U.S. Model BIT, Article 5(2) and (3). 
 
Interpretive note of 31 July 2001 by the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission. 
 
See the Glamis Gold interpretation of 
the customary minimum standard 
under NAFTA Article 1105, which 
excluded from that standard the 
concepts of free-standing legitimate 
expectations and simple (as oppposed 
to manifest) arbitrary treatment (Glamis 
Gold 2009, para. 598-626). 
Clarify that most-favored-nation 
treatment does not extend to the 
dispute resolution provisions of 
other treaties. 
 
Clarify that most-favored-nation 
treatment does not invalidate the 
specific or general exceptions in 
NAFTA. 
 
Clarify that general measures 
adopted for a public purposes 
may have varying effects on 











Conditions access to NAFTA 
investor-state arbitration based 
on the terms of NAFTA rather 
than other treaties. 
 
May limit expansive 
interpretations by tribunals of 
the concept of discrimination 
and its corresponding process of 
comparative analysis. 
No U.S.-Colombia FTA, Article 10.4(2), 
note 2. 
U.S.-Peru FTA, Article 10.4(2), note 2. 
 
Canada-Peru FTA, Annex 804.1. 
 
Norway draft Model BIT, Article 4(1), 




treatment unless the measure is 
demonstrated to be (1) 
intentionally discriminatory or (2) 
discriminatory in its effects on the 
relevant foreign investors as a 
group. 
Clarify that general measures 
adopted for a public purposes 
may have varying effects on 
investors and that this does not 
violate national treatment unless 
the measure is demonstrated to be 
(1) intentionally discriminatory or 
(2) discriminatory in its effects on 





May limit expansive 
interpretations by tribunals of 
the concept of discrimination 
and its corresponding process of 
comparative analysis (e.g. Pope & 
Talbot). 
No Norway draft Model BIT, Article 3(1), 
note 2. 
 
IISD Model International Investment 
Agreement (2005), Article 5(E). 
 
See the ADF tribunal’s interpretation 
of Article 1102, concluding that a 
foreign investor must provide evidence 
of sectoral discrimination in order to 
establish a de facto (i.e. unintentional) 






Proposed reform Relevant 
principle(s) 
Comment/ rationale Requires 
amendment? 
References 
CHECK THE DISCRETION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS 
Clarify that tribunals should defer 
to common submissions of the 
NAFTA governments on the 
appropriate interpretation of the 






May preclude a tribunal from 
rejecting common submissions 
of the NAFTA governments, 
including the investor’s home 
government, in favor of an 
expansive pro-investor position 
(e.g. GAMI, para. 29-30, and 




Provide expressly in NAFTA 
Article 1131(2) that any tribunal 
award ‘must be consistent’ with an 
interpretation of NAFTA by the 






Removes any doubt that 
tribunals are bound by the Free 
Trade Commission’s interpretive 
notes, and that they may not 
avoid such interpretations by 
styling them as amendments. 
Yes U.S.-Chile FTA, Article 10.21(3). 
Indicate that tribunals should 
defer to domestic legislative and 
judicial decisions, and policy 
decisions of the executive, so long 
as the decision does not target 











Encourages tribunals to defer to 
decision-makers at the domestic 
level in light of their superior 
representation, independence, or 
expertise. 
No NA 
Clarify that the remedial authority 
of tribunals permits them to 
award partial damages, or simply a 
costs award or declaratory award, 
as adequate satisfaction for a 
state’s violation of the treaty. 
 





Ensures that tribunals are aware 
of their ability to tailor the 
remedy of damages in order to 
preserve regulatory flexibility and 
predictability, and to reflect the 
blameworthiness of the state in 
the face of obligations that are 
unclear or subject to conflicting 
No NAFTA Article 1135. 
 
The European Court of Justice has 
limited its Francovich doctrine of state 
liability, by which individuals may be 
awarded money compensation for a 
member state’s violations of EU law, 
by requiring that the state’s violation be 
 26 
damages award is not appropriate 
where a respondent state was not 
sufficiently blameworthy. 
interpretations by past tribunals. 
 
 
‘sufficiently serious’ before damages 
can be awarded (Brasserie du Pêcheur 
1996, 990).  
Clarify that the foreign investor 
has the burden in investor-state 
arbitration of proving (1) a 
violation of the treaty, (2) any 
damages it has sustained, and (3) 
that the treaty violation was the 





May preclude unduly pro-
investor awards of damages by 
tribunals. 
No U.S.-Uruguay BIT, Protocol (section 
2). 
Establish a standing process of 
the Free Trade Commission to 
identify areas where NAFTA 





Enhances the coherence of the 
regime. 
 U.S.-Chile FTA, Article 10.13 
(envisioning periodic review of 
implication of the agreement). 
 




Proposed reform Relevant 
principle(s) 
Comment/ rationale Requires 
amendment? 
References 
EXCEPTIONS TO PROTECT LEGITIMATE REGULATION 
Extend NAFTA’s general 






Allows for regulatory measures 
to be justified on grounds of 
public welfare, consistent with 
other trade and post-NAFTA 
investment treaties. 
Yes NAFTA Article 2101 (incorporating 
the general exceptions under GATT 
Article XX, but not extending them to 
the investment chapter). 
 
Canada Model BIT, Article 10(1). 
 
Norway draft Model BIT, Article 24. 
 
IISD Model International Investment 
Agreement (2005), Article 25. 
Substitute ‘necessary to’ for 
‘related to’ in the phrasing of 
exceptions for environmental and 






Widens the scope of this 
exception, consistent with post-
NAFTA treaties. 
Yes CAFTA, Article 10.9(2)(c)(iii). 
U.S.-Chile FTA, Article 10.5(3)(c)(iii). 
U.S.-Colombia FTA, Article 
10.9(3)(c)(iii). 
U.S.-Peru FTA, Article 10.9(3)(c)(iii). 
U.S.-Uruguay BIT, Article 8(3)(c)(iii). 
U.S.-Rwanda BIT, Article 8(3)(c)(iii). 
U.S. Model BIT, Article 8(3)(c)(iii). 
Revise the prohibition on 
performance requirements to 
permit the adoption of measures 
that boost productivity and 
employment. 
 
Provide a specific exceptions for 
measures that require investors to 
use specific technology to meet 









currently prohibited under 
NAFTA Article 1106 have a 
documented record of boosting 
productivity and employment, 
and should be available for 
tailored use in this respect by 
NAFTA governments, perhaps 
supervised by a regional 
investment commission. 
Yes Norway draft Model BIT, Article 7(2). 
 
IISD Model International Investment 
Agreement (2005), Article 12. 
Establish a general exception for Sustainable Allows greater predictability and Yes U.S.-Uruguay BIT, Article 20(2)(a); 
 28 
prudential measures, including 
measures related to ensuring the 
integrity and stability of the 
financial system. 
development – 
stability of the 
financial system 
flexibility in financial regulation. U.S. Model BIT, Article 20(2)(a). 
 
Canada Model BIT, Article 10(2) and 
(3). 
 
Norway draft Model BIT, Article 25. 
 
IISD Model International Investment 
Agreement (2005), Article 51(B). 
Provide for a period, after the 
adoption of financial measures, 
during which no claim can be 
brought and no compensation 
entitlement arises for foreign 
investors.  
 
Establish a general exception for 
non-discriminatory measures that 
are adopted in good faith to limit 
cross-border transfers of capital 
where aimed at ensuring the 




stability of the 
financial system 
Ensures regulatory flexibility in 
the face of a financial crisis. 
 
Protects the ability of regulators 
to safeguard the financial system. 
Yes U.S.-Chile FTA, Annex 10-C(1)(e). 
 
Canada-Colombia FTA, Annex 810. 
Canada Model BIT, Article 14(6). 
Clarify that the exception in 
NAFTA Article 1109(4) for good 
faith application of laws relating 
to dealing in ‘securities’ also 
includes dealing in ‘futures, 
options, or derivatives’. 
Sustainable 
development – 
stability of the 
financial system 
Precludes an unduly anti-
regulation interpretation of the 
term ‘securities’ by tribunals, and 
is consistent with post-NAFTA 
reforms. 
No CAFTA, Article 10.8(4)(b). 
U.S.-Chile FTA, Article 10.8(5)(b). 
U.S.-Colombia FTA, Article 10.8(4)(b). 
U.S.-Peru FTA, Article 10.8(4)(b). 
U.S.-Rwanda BIT, Article 7(4)(b). 
Allow an exception to the 
obligation to permit capital 
transfers in NAFTA Article 
1109(1) for measures concerning 





Allows a government to hold a 
foreign investor responsible for 
its duties and obligations by 
restricting capital transfers in 
response to specific damage it 
Yes Norway draft Model BIT, Article 
9(3)(ii)(d). 
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the prevention and remedying of 
environmental damage. 
has caused. 
Allow the respondent state to 
raise as a defense that the claimant 
has not complied with its duties 
and obligations under applicable 





Enables consideration of the  
foreign investor’s duties and 
obligations in investor-state 
arbitrations. 
Yes IISD Model International Investment 




Proposed reform Relevant 
principle(s) 
Comment/ rationale Requires 
amendment? 
References 
REVISE THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
Revise the statement of objectives 
of NAFTA and of the investor-
state regime to refer to – for 
example – the importance of 
policy space and regulatory 
flexibility, corporate social 
responsibility, and equitable 
governance of investment 
disputes based on judicial 











The treaty’s objectives should 
refer to public welfare aims 
alongside those of increased 
investment. Tribunals have relied 
on the current statement of 
objectives to support unduly 
pro-investor interpretations of 
Chapter 11 (e.g. Metalclad). 
Yes NAFTA, Articles 102(1)(c) and 1115. 
 
U.S.-Colombia FTA, Section B 
(omitting any statement of objectives 
regarding investor-state dispute 
settlement). 
 
Canada-Peru FTA, Article 810. 
Canada-Colombia FTA, Article 816. 
 
Canada-Colombia FTA, Article 818; 
Canada Model BIT, Article 20 (each 
adopting a neutral statement as to the 
objectives of investor-state arbitration). 
 
Norway draft Model BIT, preamble. 
 
IISD Model International Investment 
Agreement (2005), preamble and 
Article 1. 
 
 
 
